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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA G. KANGAS, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
RALPH C. KANGAS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 940633-CA 
Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(i) (1994) (appeals from district court involving 
domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
WHETHER THE AWARD OF ALIMONY, IN THIS CASE, IS 
EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE FACT THAT APPELLEE IS ABLE TO ENJOY A HIGHER 
STANDARD OF LIVING THAN THE APPELLANT? 
This matter was preserved for appeal based upon the 
presentation of evidence presented and the closing argument of 
counsel. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court judge abused his discretion in his 
establishment of unjust alimony award. 
Where a trial court may exercise broad discretion, 
we presume the correctness of the court's decision 
absent "manifest injustice or inequity that 
indicates a clear abuse of discretion. 
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d at 819-820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(quoting Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6,8 (Utah 1982). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (1994). 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.7 (1994). 
Art. I, § 1, Utah State Constitution. 
Art. I, § 7 , Utah State Constitution. 
Art. I, § 24, Utah State Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the case: 
This case arises from a divorce trial. 
II. Course of proceedings: 
This case went through several pretrial hearings, none 
of which are at issue in this appeal, the case was finally tried 
to the court on June 9, 1994. 
III. Disposition in trial court: 
The plaintiff was granted a Decree of Divorce. 
IV. Statement of facts: 
The parties herein were married on October 11, 1969 (TT 
p. 28). They have two minor children who remain at home. (TT p. 
29). In the Decree of Divorce the appellee was awarded the 
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marital residence. (see paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce, 
hereinafter DD para. 10). The appellee was also awarded alimony 
in the amount of $700.00 per month (DD para. 13). The court 
found that appellee had the ability to earn $1300.00 per month, 
(see Findings of Fact paragraph 6, hereinafter FOF para. 6) The 
court further found that appellant had the ability to earn 
$3,300.00 per month. (FOF para. 20). The Court further found 
appellee's monthly expenses to be $2,400.00 per month. (FOF 
para.21). The court found the appellant's monthly expenses were 
$1,700.00 (FOF para. 21). 
The appellee claimed expenses of $2,886.90 per month 
(TT p. 55 and 128). The appellant claimed monthly expenses of 
$2,220 (TT p. 252). The trial found that appellee's monthly 
expense were a little high based upon the fact that some "may not 
be appropriate for these calculations and some others may be 
slightly high." (TT p. 295). 
Appellee submitted exhibit 5 which was a list of her 
expenses (TT p. 55). In exhibit 5 appellee claims that she is 
paying "Donations and Contributions" in the amount of $242.00. 
Appellee indicates that this amount is actually for what she 
referred to as a "ten percent tithe on my income, and a fast 
offering. I believe that"s probably $80.00 for scouts." (TT p. 
49). Appellee requests the trial court to award her $140.00 per 
month as and for auto repairs and expenses. (TT p. 44). She 
further wants automobile payments. (TT p. 47). Appellee wants a 
budget for gifts in the amount of $20.00 per month. (TT p. 49-
50). These expenses appear to arbitrary and to a degree intended 
to be used for the sole purpose of inflating appellee's budget 
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for the purpose of being awarded alimony. Appellee appears to be 
taking the position that she is entitled to maintain the customs 
and traditions she had while married to appellant. (see TT p. 49 
and 50) Here she attempts to show that the payment of "tithing" 
was traditional in the marriage and then to show that the giving 
of gifts was traditional. This is a burden she chooses to have 
Mr. Kangas absorb for her by paying an increased alimony. She 
further testified that the amount of money she was claiming to 
need was based upon the life style that was enjoyed during the 
marriage and when said life style consisted of both parties 
incomes. (TT p. 54) She went on to say that her budget was a 
little high, because of the household maintenance. (TT p. 54). 
She then attempts to make her own financial situation appear to 
worse than it was by deducting from her income $229.45 per month 
for child support (TT p. 56). She would claim all of the 
expenses associated with raising the children to justify child 
support and alimony (Trial Exhibit 5). And ask for more money by 
deducting out said support. Appellee would not even want to 
include appellant's child support payments in her budget. 
Appellant, as a result of the break down of the marital 
relationship and this action, moved from the marital residence. 
(TT p. 202) He had one of his minor children, April, living with 
him. (TT p. 241). Appellant testified that he thought it would 
be appropriate to sell the house to pay off debts and free up 
substantial income (TT p. 226). Appellant testified that he 
lived in a small house, and that if he had the chance he would 
like to live in a home comparable with the marital residence of 
the parties (TT p. 247). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
At the time of trial the trial judge awarded the 
plaintiff/appellee alimony in the amount of $700.00. It is clear 
from the testimony of the parties that this was a clear abuse of 
discretion by the trial judge. The parties testified that they 
had been married for 24 years. (Trial Transcript Page 28, 
hereinafter TT p. 28). They further testified that they had 
owned the marital residence for a period of 14 years (TT p. 61-
2). There was testimony about the actual money spent for living 
expenses by the appellee (TT p. 151-154). This amount was 
substantially less than what the trial judge found to be 
reasonable living expenses. The appellant lost a substantial 
portion of his standard of living after the parties separated. 
The trial court appeared to be more concerned about the wife's 
standard of living and not nearly so concerned about the husbands 
standard of living. There appeared to be no attempt to equalize 
the parties post divorce standard of living. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
WHETHER THE AWARD OF ALIMONY, IN THIS CASE, IS EXCESSIVE 
DUE TO THE FACT THAT APPELLEE IS ABLE TO ENJOY A HIGHER 
STANDARD OF LIVING THAN THE APPELLANT? 
A. Introduction. 
This case is petitioned for review based upon this 
Court's ruling that this case has been filed as a frivolous 
appeal. Appellant strongly urges this Court to review its 
decision and find this case in favor of the appellant. This 
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Court in its opinion stated that action has not been filed "on a 
good faith argument to extend, modify, c: reverse existing law." 
Appellant exclaims that this case is a good faith petition to 
extend or modify existing law. 
Based on the trial court's findings under the Jones 
factors, the trial court determined that the Husband earned 
$2,900 per month and Wife earned $1,300 per month. The trial 
court also determined that the Husband had reasonable monthly 
expenses of $1,700 and the Wife had reasonable monthly expenses 
of $2,400. Therefore, based on these calculations the Wife's 
expenses exceed her income by $1,100 and the Husband has an 
ability to pay her the $700 in which was awarded to the Wife. 
It is Appellant's position that the alimony award is 
excessive under the Jones factors and demonstrates a disparate 
treatment of Husbands in divorce situations. This Court has 
defined the purpose of alimony. This general purpose, "is to 
prevent the receiving spouse, [husband or wife,] from becoming a 
public charge and, to the extent possible, to maintain the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991). 
Appellant interprets this definition in two parts, (1) 
to prevent either spouse from becoming a public charge and (2) to 
equalize the parties ability to maintain the standard of living. 
In this case, the parties were married for 24 years. At the time 
of divorce, both parties were not enjoying the same standard of 
living that they enjoyed during the course of the marriage. 
Since the point of separation, the parties standard of living 
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were dramatically different. Appellant in his brief attempted to 
demonstrate the disparity between the parties both during their 
post separation and post divorce. Apparently, by this Court's 
opinion Appellant failed to make his argument clear, so he shall 
attempt it again. 
During the marriage, the parties lived in a 3 bedroom 
home. The wife was awarded the home and custody of the parties' 
children. In doing so, the husband was ordered to pay child 
support. The child support award was $517.18 with a deduction of 
$55.84 for a monthly medical insurance premium. Therefore, once 
the Husband has paid the Wife the monthly child support the 
Husband has available $738.66 and the Wife has a need of $638.66. 
The trial court ordered an alimony award of $700.00. Once the 
child support is removed from the Husband's income/debt he is 
left with $38.66 and the Wife's income/debt is increased to 
$61.34. 
However closely fair this Jones demonstration may 
indicate there is a disparate treatment of the Husband. When you 
take this Jones demonstration and view it under the totality of 
the circumstance the disparity becomes more clear. The Jones 
factors must be modified to include "in light of the totality of 
the circumstance." 
The parties were married for 24 years. The Wife prior 
to divorce enjoyed living in a three bedroom home and the income 
that met all her needs. Post separation and post divorce the 
Wife still has that luxury. In contrast, the Husband enjoyed the 
very same standard of living prior to the parties1 separation. 
Since the parties' separation and to date the Husband has not and 
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cannot enjoy the same luxury of enjoying the same standard of 
living. His standard of living has dramatically dropped. As a 
result of the Jones factors and the disparate application of the 
Jones factors the Husband must live in a basement apartment. 
This is just one example of how the Jones factors creates 
disparate treatment of husbands and wives or in other words men 
and women. The Jones factors must be viewed in light of the 
totality of circumstances in order to end this disparity. 
B. the Jones factors are unconstitutional as a matter of 
law. 
The Utah State Constitution clearly states in Article 
I, Section 24: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
Id. This is interpreted as guaranteeing that a law must apply 
equally to all persons within a class and that statutory 
classification must have a reasonable tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute. See Malanf 693 P.2d at 670; 
Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 816; State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 467 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also Zissi v. State Tax Com'n of Utah, 
842 P.2d 848, 855 (Utah 1992). 
The Jones factors as current law states, are: (1) the 
financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the 
ability of the receiving spouse to provide for him and herself; 
and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide the support. 
See, Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992). 
The factors should include a review of the parties before Divorce 
and after Divorce to assure fairness in the Divorce and further, 
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to determine whether the alimony award is fair and just under the 
totality of the circumstances. 
Appellant reiterates that the purpose of alimony is (1) 
to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge, 
and (2) to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. In this case, the Wife is the receiving spouse. She 
is not a public charge, neither is the Husband. In equity, it 
would be completely without reason to create the Husband as a 
public charge at the expense of preventing the Wife from becoming 
a public charge. But Part (1) of the purpose is not at issue. 
At issue is Part (2). It is not the court's purpose to secure 
the Standard of Living for just one party. The courts have an 
obligation to remain neutral in all cases. However, as this case 
indicates there is not a neutrality when it comes to divorces. 
The courts typically award alimony to women and not men. 
Consequently, this is determined exclusively in reliance on the 
Jones factors and does not take into account the parties 
standards of living, both prior and post divorce. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, there is a disparate 
treatment of men and women in the courts when determining alimony 
awards under the current Jones factors which would be eliminated 
if the courts considered the Jones factors under the totality of 
the circumstances. Comparatively , the current Jones factors are 
unconstitutional insofar as the Husband has a substandard of 
living that is still currently enjoyed by the Wife. Hence, 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reconsider its 
order and rehear this matter to include that arguments stated 
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hereinabove and in his argument previously submitted in his Brief 
of Appellant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /fe day of 
February, 1996. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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